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The universals and cultural variations of human development have been the focus
of fruitful study by anthropologists for decades. In recent years psychologists also
have directed their attention, long overdue, to understanding development in cul
tural context. There are striking differences among psychologists, however, in the
approaches they take to culture and development. Most markedly, Cole (1989)
distinguishes two very different theoretical perspectives on cultural psychology
and its approach to human development. In one perspective the focus is on culture
as a collective enterprise (e.g., Gauvain, in press; Shweder, 1990; Super and
Harkness, 1986). There is no need in this view for focusing on the individual
development of individual children since all important forms of learning are so
cially distributed; children simply become more skillful over time at participating
in various collective activities (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Indeed, in some versions
of this more sociological view of cultural psychology the focus on the cultural
collective is so strong that there is really no justification for reference to the eve
opment of individuals at all: "Individual, interpersonal, and sociocultural pro
cesses constitute each other and cannot be separated (Rogoff, Chavajay, an
Matusov, 1993, p. 533).
.
. , + ....
,
The other perspective on cultural psychology is more in line wit ra i lona
psychological approaches to the individual person in culture. In t s ^iew. 1
important to distinguish individual children and the cultures into which they are
born. A central focus of this approach is the competence that chi ren r,n§ 0
process of enculturation and how this competence contributes to their interna ization of various aspects of their cultures (Vygotsky, 19 78). In t isviewan^
sive focus on the collectivity to the neglect of individuals makes 1^.I"ip0S^l],
understand the cognitive development of such individuals as au is IC
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who never become very skillful at participating in collective activities, and nonhuman primates, who do not grow up in cultures at all (Tomasello 1990).
Our own previous work has been decidedly within this more psychological, and
less sociological, orientation to human development in cultural contexts. In 1993,
for example we and Hilary Ratner proposed a theory of cultural learning that
attempted to explain how children's developing social cognition leads to new forms
of participation in cultural activities and thus to new ways of internalizing impor
tant aspects of their cultures (Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner, 1993). For instance,
we hypothesized that it was not until children could understand other persons as
mental agents, with thoughts and beliefs that differed from their own, that they
could engage in the kinds of internal dialogues of private and self-regulating speech
that Vygotsky (1978) described some years ago—since such dialogues often pre
suppose two distinct mental perspectives on the same situation.
We have seen no data and heard no arguments to dissuade us from our more
psychologically based view of cultural psychology. However, based on the responses
to our ideas that we have received, especially from cultural anthropologists and
cultural psychologists, it is clear that our theory of cultural learning as we origin
ally formulated and presented it focused too narrowly on the cognitive capacities
of the individual child. For a more balanced and complete theory, we need to com
plement our focus on what the child brings to the culture with a focus on what
the culture brings to the child. We believe that there are two aspects of culture
that will be especially important in formulating a more complete account.
First, it is important to emphasize, as we did not in our original account, the role
in children's development of the preexisting structure of the culture: its games,
institutions, rituals, cultural models, intentional scripts, and communal activities
—in brief, its "habitus" (Bourdieu, 1977). Children are born into some version
of this structure and these activities, and the particular version they are born into
potentiates some forms of development and constrains or even disallows other
forms of development. In many domains children develop culturally specific ways
of acting that they do not explicitly set out to learn and that no one explicitly sets
out to teach them; they simply participate in forms of activity structured by the
culture and learn some ways of behaving and thinking as a result. Our previous
account did not give adequate attention to the ways in which cultural patterns
structure children's lives, and thus for many anthropologists it was woefully in
complete (Ingold, 1993). We mostly agree with this criticism.
Second, it is important to emphasize that culture sometimes imposes itself on
children in the form of intentional instruction. In our previous account of in
structed learning we explicitly took the child's point of view, defining instructed
learning essentially as the child's internalization of adult instructions. We do not
wish to change this perspective here, but it is necessary to supplement it with a
fuller account of the process of instruction. In particular we need to respond to the
criticism of our theory that we portrayed adult instruction in an excessively West
ern fashion. On the one hand, Rogoff et al. (1993; see also Foreman, 1993)
argued that in some cultures there is basically no intentional instruction of chil
dren, and thus our entire treatment of instructed learning as the internalization o
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adult instruction was misguided. Olson and Astington (1993), on the other hand,
simply pointed out that our treatment of instruction did not adequately explicate
the adult side of the interaction, not taking into account the different types of
instruction that exist in different cultures and the cognitive abilities that these
require of the adult. We do not agree that there are cultures that do not intention
ally instruct their young, as we hope to demonstrate in this paper, but we do agree
that there are differences in the type of instruction employed in different cultures,
and that these will have important consequences for children's development.
In this paper, we attempt to make our theory of cultural learning more com
plete by giving an account of the process of cultural learning not from the point
of view of the child, but from the point of view of the culture. In the process, we
try to address the two shortcomings of our theory just elaborated. First, we briefly
discuss the role of preexisting cultural patterns as an important part of the
enculturation process. We are brief on this score because there is no controversy
here; we only wish to appropriate the ideas of many anthropologists who have
emphasized this aspect of learning culture (e.g., Quinn and Strauss, 1994; Shweder,
1990). Second, we deal with instruction and instructed learning. In this case we
must go into more detail because we have disagreements here with other cultural
psychologists on several important issues, even over such fundamental points as
the definition of intentional instruction. We conclude with brief discussions of the
role of intentional instruction in cognitive development and the implications of
our theoretical approach for processes of education.

Individual Learning of Culture
Tomasello, Kruger, Ratner (1993) went to great lengths to distinguish cultural
learning from individual learning, but also, importantly, from other orms o socia
learning. For example, we argued that many animals are expose to some earn
ing situations that they otherwise would not be exposed to because t ey o ow
their mothers and other group members. Sometimes the changes o s a e in e
world that adults bring about through their individual efforts (e.g., opening nu s)
reveal to the developing youngster affordances of the environment that it previ
ously did not know existed (e.g., that nuts can be opene an
ave so
edible inside). We call this emulation learning.
Our definition of cultural learning, however, singles out t ose ins ^
cial learning in which the child learns something more eep y S0C1
physical fact that nuts can be opened. In cultural learning c 1 r®^
akout the
about affordances of the inanimate environment but also somet lg
intentional states of adults-what they intend to do in
or, perhaps, the strategy they are using or thoughts they are
n
•
learning the child does not leam from the adult* actions, but he child learns
through the adult's perspective in a truly intersubjective as 10 '
children intant in our definition of cultural learning that on many occasions chton
ternalize adults' intentional attitudes from such enc°un
their own. Within this definitional framework we identified thr

0f cuItural
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learning: imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning. The
fact that these three types of learning emerge in human ontogeny in an invariant
developmental sequence—imitative, instructed, collaborative—was explained
through references to the different levels of understanding of the intentional states
of others that children of different ages are able to employ—specifically, the under
standing of others as intentional agents, mental agents, and reflective agents.
In our original paper we were quite explicit that cultural learning may only
account for a few of the child's learning experiences. Its importance lies in the fact
that it enables many uniquely human cultural activities and artifacts—for exam
ple, the learning and use of conventional symbols and language. However, it is
clear that children learn many other things about culture in ways that do not
invoke such intersubjective forms of interaction and learning. Following Bourdieu
(1977), Quinn and Strauss (1994) refer to the habitus of culture, the cultural
"schemas" that lead children down certain culturally specific developmental path
ways. For example, children in traditional hunter-gatherer societies are exposed to
a particular set of practices during infancy, one of which is being carried in close
contact with their mother's body throughout the day. At a very young age the
babies become familiar with the smell of their mother's skin, the sensation of being
carried as she walks, the warmth of the sun on their scalps, the touch of the sack
they are carried in, and the taste of breast milk. As the babies develop, their experi
ences multiply, but those experiences are always delimited. For children growing
up in various cultures, what will become familiar or "second nature" will be based
on the particular set of experiences that define their young lives. The habits, atti
tudes, and ways of looking at the world that these experiences engender are not
something that the adult sets out to teach or something the child sets out to learn.
They are just a part of the habitus of a particular society that the child, over time,
joins.
It is interesting that other species also may learn the patterns of their social
group in this same way. Thus many behavioral ecologists refer to chimpanzee
"culture" (e.g., see Wrangham, McGrew, deWaal, and Heltne, 1994). What
they are describing with this term is a number of intergroup differences in the
behavior of chimpanzees in the wild, differences in habits such as foods eaten and
tools used. But, as argued before (Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner, 1993), based on
a wide variety of evidence, it is not very likely that chimpanzees engage in cultural
learning narrowly defined (see also Tomasello, 1994). However, it is possible that
they are learning the habitus of their group, which, like the human counterpart,
includes all of the group's habitual ways of acting. Thus a chimpanzee youngster
in one group follows its mother to a termite mound and finds holes containing
sticks with termites crawling on them, while a youngster in another group follows
its mother to nut trees and finds stones and half-opened nuts. The point is that
many animals are excellent individual learners, and if different groups of a species
adopt different behavioral practices as adaptations to their particular local ecologies
(or for whatever reasons), then their offspring will experience different sets of learn
ing experiences.
Nevertheless, the way humans engage in this process may still have two
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species-specific features. First, and perhaps more importantly, children have not
jUSt the physical environment as their habitus but also various social activities
and even cultural institutions that lead them to have highly specific learning ex
periences. For example, children in some cultures grow up in the company of a
large extended family; life is communal and materials and activities are shared
with siblings, cousins, grandparents, and others. Other children grow up in cul
tures in which individuals possess private property and in which many activities
are performed with just a few others, or even alone. The communal or private
structures of these cultures channel children's experiences in particular ways.
Second, human children "soak up" not just the outward practices of their group
but also, by inference, the values and attitudes of their group. For example, in
cultures in which children sleep in the same room with their parents, children
may deduce the importance of closeness and communality, without anyone ex
plicitly expressing those values. In cultures in which children sleep in their own
rooms, children may infer respect for individuality and privacy, all on their own.
It is possible that other animal species do not have such inferencing capacities,
which means that the transmission of the habitus of the group to the developing
individual has a wider range of influence in the human species.
Through this discussion of habitus, then, we wish to supplement our theory of
cultural learning with an account of the individual learning of cultural patterns.
It is very likely that, if quantification of such matters were possible, the individual
learning of culture contributes "more" to the differences among members of differ
ent cultures than cultural learning in our very specific definition. Nevertheless, we
maintain that many uniquely human abilities are only possible through cultural
learning as we originally defined it. Moreover, we must also point out that many
of the cultural patterns that children individually learn in the habitus of their
cultures are patterns that were originally created through processes of cultural
learning, especially collaborative learning. That is to say, such things as farming
practices that a child may come to learn more or less individually through partici
pation, were first invented by individuals collaborating with one another in an
intersubjective manner.

Intentional Instruction of Culture
>ur earlier work was also criticized for implying that intentional instruction is a
mman universal (Rogoff, Chavajay, and Matusov, 1993). The conten ion is a
many traditional societies do not practice intentional instruction since eir e
ation is informal: children learn by observing their elders ^ctivi es
J
>wn practice in the flow of everyday life (Bruner, 1972; C l s an
r
•
980). It is children who assume the responsibility lor learning; adu

ntentionally teach them (Greenfield and Lave, 1982).

fwnallv
We believe that this position is untenable, both deftationally and factaaUy.
lefinitionally, we contend that informal education is also an instance ol. rnte
ional instruction, and so our proposal that intentional ins rue 10
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universal is clearly true. But in addition, we contend, factually, that all cultures
engage in formal education; it is just that some of them do so only in a few.
circumscribed contexts. To support these contentions we will (1) propose a defini
tion of intentional instruction. (2) identify three different processes of intentional
instruction, and (3) provide evidence that all cultures engage to some extent in all
three of these processes.
Intentional Instruction in Comparative Perspective
Adults in our nearest primate relatives do all kinds ol things that serve to promote
the acquisition of particular skills. For example, chimpanzee mothers often walk
away from their young infants at the age at which they are just beginning to selflocomote (Goodall, 1986). If the infants do not follow, the mothers stop, look back,
and sometimes make noises of frustration. If the infants now follow the mother, it
can be said that she has encouraged their self-locomotion. But it could also be said
that she wishes to travel and is frustrated that the infant is not following as it
should. Thus it can be said that the mother's intentions are that the baby follow
her. not that the baby learn something. The same can be said of the well-known
example of chimpanzee mothers taking poisonous leaves away from their infants
(Goodall, 1986): She intends for them to refrain from eating the leaves, not for
them to learn to refrain from eating the leaves.
The point is that teaching is a behavior that can only be adequately defined by
its intention. We can refer to all behaviors of one animal that serve to facilitate
some behavior by another as "teaching" (e.g., as Caro and Hauser, 1992). but it
then loses all of its meaning. Teaching is a behavior in which one animal intends
that another learn some skill or acquire some bit of information or knowledge that
it did not have previously. Such an intentional definition is not hopelessly
unverifiable; rather it is quite easily identified. The teacher needs to behave in
ways that are adapted to the skill level of the learner, for example, providing more
and different kinds of instruction when the skill level is low, changing as the learner
becomes more skillful, and ceasing when the skill level becomes self-sufficient. In
any case, if we restrict our definition of teaching to intentional forms—or if we
posit a subcategory of teaching termed intentional teaching—then the most seri
ous candidates from the nonhuman world are those that have been recently re
ported by Boesch (1991, 1993).
For almost a decade Boesch has been observing chimpanzees in western Africa
as they crack and eat nuts—which they do on a daily basis during certain seasons
of the year. They place one of several varieties of nut on some type of rigid substrate
such as a stone or root (called the anvil) and then pound it with either a stone or
hefty stick (called the hammer). It is not an easy skill for youngsters to learn and
it typically takes them several years of practice (during the one- to five-year age
range) before they attain adult-like skill levels. In this context Boesch has observed
a number of ways that the behavior of mothers serves to facilitate the nut cracking
of their offspring. In line with an intentional definition, he has divided his obser
vations into "facilitation" and "active teaching." Observations of facilitation are
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fairly common and consist mainly of mothers allowing their infants to use their
hammers or nuts (which they tend not to let other animals do). This behavior is
consistent with mothers allowing children to take food from their hands (which
they also do not allow others to do). In his decade of observation Boesch has seen
only two instances of what he considers active teaching. They are important enough
that we will cite them each at some length (paraphrased from Boesch. 1993.
pp. 176-177).
(1) A mother was cracking some very hard nuts, with her son eating most of them. The son
then tried to crack some nuts for himself, with limited success. At one point he placed a
partly open nut on the anvil in a way not conducive to successful opening. Before he could
strike the nut, however, his mother picked it up. wiped off the anvil, and placed it on the
anvil in the correct position. The son then successfully struck and opened the nut.
(2) A daughter was attempting unsuccessfully to open nuts with an irregularly shaped
hammer. Her mother then joined her. The daughter pushed the poor hammer to the mother.
The mother then, in a very deliberate manner (for over one minute), rotated the hammer
into its best position for pounding the nut. She then successfully opened a number of nuts,
with both mother and daughter eating them. The mother then left and the daughter pro
ceeded to make attempts on her own. with mixed success but always with the hammer in
the orientation her mother had used.
Boesch claims that in the tirst example the mother anticipated her son s im
pending failure and intervened to ensure his success. Perhaps. But it is also pos
sible that she noticed from her own previous experience that the nut was not
correctly positioned and positioned it for herself, which her son then exploited.
Boesch interprets the second example as the mother correcting her daughter s
mistake and demonstrating the correct method. Again, perhaps this is correct, but
it is also possible that the mother was simply using the hammer to crack nuts for
herself as she normally would. The only behavioral evidence for the instructional
interpretation of this observation is that the mother very slowly rotated the ham
mer into the most efficient position for her own cracking attempts. And even i t e
mothers were intending that their infants successfully crack a nut on these singu
lar occasions, the intention that the child succeed is still different from the inten
tion that they learn. In any case, these two isolated observations would be much
easier to interpret if they fell into a larger pattern of instructional activity in this
and other contexts in the chimpanzees' lives. For now, we remain skeptical that
the mothers' intentions were to help their infants learn to crack nuts e lcien y.
Overall, the difference between human intentional instruction and all ol these
examples from nonhuman primates is that human adults do whatever * neces
sary so that children will learn skills for themselves, and then, wheni children
attain a certain level of skill, withdraw. If a child is not successful initia y.
adult keeps at it, adjusting instruction as necessary, with t ec i s se su
competency as a goal. Moreover, as Bruner (1993) points out, in many si
of human life there is an onus placed on children: Children are expec e

from the instruction, perhaps so that they can eventually be helpfu o
are dealt with harshly if they do not. Human pedagogica in en ions

1
a

,
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themselves manifest both in adults' propensity to show children how to do things,
and in the adults' expectation that children will become more self-sufficient and
competent as a result.

Three Processes of Intentional Instruction
Although all human societies expect their children to learn, what varies both
within and between cultures is the adults' beliefs about how this learning will take
place and about the degree to which active instruction is necessary. We hypo
thesize three types of adult theory of child learning and consequent level of adult
involvement in education. These hypothesized types are actually prototypes, hypo
thetical pure cases. We recognize that real life is less pristine than our theory;
indeed, the nature of these adult beliefs as they actually exist may resemble our
prototypes, or they may be on the borderline between two types or a mixture of
types. We take the risk of oversimplification for the heuristic benefits that accrue,
and we argue that to some degree these three types are present in all human
societies.
First, adults believe that children "come up" to master some skills on their own.
They assume that children are competent learners just as they are competent
growers. This expectation arises from the theory that nature provides for learning,
just as it does for growing, and that adult participation is not required in either
process. Adults in these cases are not indifferent to children's learning; in fact,
their interest in learning is profound enough to produce a theoretical understand
ing that guides practice. Should their theory prove faulty in some instances, adults
will adapt both theory and practice to make sure that children learn. For example,
in most Western cultures the skill of walking is expected to develop naturally, but
if it does not, adults intervene in the process. This expectation of learning, and the
intention to provide for it if the need arises, distinguishes human adults from the
adults of other primate species, as described above. The adults' approach to edu
cation in these cases may be called laissez-faire, and it is present when the skill to
be learned is not highly valued or when it is simple. We call this educational style
expected learning because adults anticipate that children will learn on their own,
that learning will happen naturally.
Second, adults believe that children need guidance to learn complex or valued
tasks, that they need to "bring up" their children to master certain skills. They feel
that although children might eventually learn such skills on their own, their in
tervention enables children's acquisition of challenging skills more rapidly and
efficiently. In some cases the adult requires the child to observe a particular prac
tice at a particular time. In other cases the adult allows the child to participate in
the task to the extent to which the child is currently able. The adult might simplify
the task, adding more demonstration or explanation when necessary, and increase
difficulty and reduce assistance as the child progresses. This type of practice is
easily distinguishable from "teaching" by other primates because it is so clearly
intentional; the adult persists in the practice until the child is successful. This level
of adult involvement may be called scaffolding; it requires sensitive observation of
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Three tgpes of intentional instruction and their associated adult beliefs and

activities
Adult beliefs

Adult activities

Types of tasks

Types of practice

Expected learning

learning occurs
through
maturation

Laissez-faire

Simple or
not valued

Informal

Guided learning

Learning needs

Scaffolding

Moderately
complex or
valued

Semiformal

Teaching

Highly complex
or valued

Formal

assistance

Designed learning

Learning needs
insistence and
direct
instruction

the child's performance and attention to the child's experiences to enhance learn
ing. This type of practice is semiformal, falling between informal and formal in the
quantity and quality of structure provided. We call this educational style guided
learning, because children's efforts at learning benefit from adults' assistance.
Third, adults believe that in some situations learning must be created, that they
must effortfully "pull up" their children to certain skills and standards. They as
sume that children alone will never be able to master highly complex, abstract
or valued tasks and that precise instruction is necessary to prepare for eventual
mastery. The adult understands the uniqueness and importance of the tasks an
understands that it is virtually impossible to learn these tasks by methods other
than those that are the most motivating and persuasive. Consequently, the adult s
level of involvement is high, designing a special setting for the learning an com
municating the information in a systematic way. This type o practice is orma.,
and the adult's activity may be termed teaching. We call this educattona stye
designed learning, emphasizing the responsibility of the adult to e or u y
the learning situations. While designed learning is not used by all <^tures
all situations, it is used by all cultures in some domains, as we s ow m ®
that follows. A summary of these three types of instruction appears in T able
. .

Intentional Instruction in Different Societies

To check for the presence of these three levels of adult
tion of children, we surveyed the anthropological literature **
societies. These societies have a wide geographic distribute and; ™ge
types from camps (foragers like the IKung San of Botswana) to cluetans (traders
like the Puluwatans of the Western Caroline Islands) to people i
(like the Chaga living on the slopes of Mount
'
societies. More specifically, these cultures were selected to tesi

g

Y

nQnliterate

he hypothesis

_v

that
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even the smallest-scale society features intentional teaching of children, if only for
a few and special tasks.
Expected Learning People living in small-scale societies are widely believed to have
a hands-off attitude toward the education of children. This is true for many tasks
and skills, often because they are assumed to develop naturally. For example, the
Tallensi of Taleland in northern Ghana, West Africa, live in a small-scale farming
society. According to Fortes (1970), life skills (e.g., chopping, carrying, washing)
are acquired via the Tallensi children's participation in the ongoing flow of activ
ity. The adults assume that skills develop with practice, just as the body grows
with time. Children are thought to be capable and desirous of learning, so the
adults stay out of the process. About child development, the adults remark, "Naawun
mpaan ba [heaven teaches them]" (p. 37). Similarly, the Manus people of New
Guinea (Mead, 1930) assume that physical skills, and even grace, develop natu
rally. Although their world presents many physical challenges to young children,
they are never taught. The children learn to swim, to walk over treacherous wooden
slats, to canoe, and many other skills by straightforward immersion and participa
tion in the activities.
On the island of Samoa, adults believe that children learn best when they are
left alone to observe and adopt adult behaviors over time. Consequently, adults
make few accommodations to young children. For example, Samoan parents do
not simplify their speech when they address their sons and daughters. Instead,
they expect the children to come up to adult speech standards on their own. The
adults believe that for children "the way to knowledge and power is to serve (i.e.,
attend)" (Ochs, 1988, p. 205). The IKung San of the Kalahari Desert in Botswana
(Konner, 1982) claim that infants cry because they have no "sense." There is no
use for adults to try to stop the babies from being senseless. The IKung believe that
when the babies grow older they will develop sense on their own. This expectation
of maturation constitutes a belief about how the child changes with age. It is
important to note, however, that if the belief is violated by experience, as when a
child fails to learn on its own an important task, such as food gathering, adults
behave differently. They adjust their theory and become more assertive about the
need to learn. In such an instance, IKung adults make a piquant comment, such
as, "Maybe this child doesn't like to eat" (M. Konner, personal communication,
1994). The implication of this usually requires no further elaboration for the child.
As we see in this example, the societies that possess maturational theories of child
development and who sometimes practice laissez-faire education also have other
theories about development and other levels of involvement, depending on the
particularities of the individual, the task, and its domain.
Guided Learning There is evidence that adults in all cultures believe children need
a careful, graduated program of guidance to learn at least some more complex
skills. In these circumstances, adults expect children to eventually learn, but they
scaffold the child's acquisition of ability nevertheless. For example, Tallensi young
people serve as apprentices to skilled practitioners, such as leatherworkers.
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Although the apprentices learn mostly by observation and participation in the
practice, they also are given explanations by the masters when necessary (Fortes,
1970). Mayan mothers simplify the task of tortilla making for their daughters;
they give pointers, make demonstrations, provide suggestions, and adjust the task
to increases in skill (Rogoff, 1990). Early in their career, Liberian apprentice tai
lors are allowed to work on parts of clothing that are inexpensive (in case they
botch the job) and on pieces of the material that do not show (Greenfield and Lave,
1982). With time and improved skills, they are given more important work, even
tually being trusted to make entire articles of clothing. In Mexico, Zinacanteco
girls learn to weave by observation and active participation, but they receive sim
plified situations, corrections, and help from the adults (Childs and Greenfield,
1980), and the support supplied by adults varies inversely with the skill level of
the learner. Adult structuring of learning situations can be quite subtle. In some
cases adults simply encourage observation generally; in other cases they may point
out certain events for particular notice (Rogoff et al„ 1993). Scaffolding also can
be nonverbal, as when a Rotuman parent in Melanesia simply adjusts a child's
body position during a task (Howard, 1970), or when a parent makes a tiny bow
for a little boy to practice hunting or a tiny bucket for a young girl to use in
carrying water (Fortes, 1970).
These are examples of semiformal, scaffolded interaction, in which the adult
intervenes to prevent the learner from going hopelessly off track, from ruining a
piece of work, or from becoming discouraged. The adult's expertise is valuable to
the child, and the child's productivity is valuable to the adult. The children are not
expected to reinvent weaving or tailoring or leatherworking on their own, or to
learn them perfectly by observation and practice. Part of the adult's motivation is
economic, no doubt, but this economic need for a productive helper coincides with
their theoretical and empirical understanding of what will happen if the appren
tices are left to their own devices.
It is our contention that scaffolding is intentional instruction. The adults expect
the children to learn, but they also expect that they will have to intervene in order
to produce a skilled helper. The adults provide help in a graduated manner tha
reflects their monitoring of the child's developing capacity for more independent
work. Thus the adult's behavior reflects a theory that the learner must be active
in the flow of practice from the beginning, but that the learner s perspec lve
the task will be immature. The expert must then carefully structure the learn g
experiences to match the child's changing perspective.
Designed Learning There is evidence that highly valued sidns are carefuny taughL
even in traditional societies. Super (1981) reports that vaiuedphys^
as sitting and walking are deliberately taught to babies in most
cultures. For example, sitting is taught by placing the in an in
supports
tion supported by cloths, or by placing the infant in a sha ow (
the sitting position. This teaching takes place every day*
the expected age of performance. Clearly, these adults in
cultures are not only practicing laissez-faire education or even scaffolding. Ihey
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are actively, intentionally teaching their infants these skills, outside the casual
practice of them, even before the infant can attempt these skills alone.
The practice of hunting among the !Kung is both highly valued as a food source
and highly complex in the skills required. Boys are given tiny bows for prac
tice. and they are allowed to tag along and participate with the adults as they
can. However, their hunting education also includes periods of storytelling and
question-and-answer sessions conducted by experts, back in camp (Konner, 1981).
These are times for hunting instruction that are set apart from the everyday prac
tice of these skills. The adults behave in a way that reflects their belief that their
knowledge is important, abstract, and essential to the hunting education of the
children.
One of the most impressive displays of teaching can be found among the Puluwat
people of the South Pacific (Gladwin. 1970). The Puluwats design and build ocean
going canoes and navigate vast expanses of open ocean by dead reckoning. Their
skills are formidable, and they pass them on to the next generation in a highly
formal manner. Apprenticeship in navigation is open only to the candidates who
are most promising, and it lasts about 20 years. Usually a boy is apprenticed to a
male relative. Boys without relatives in the practice pay dearly for the privilege of
being instructed. Less than half of those who volunteer to apprentice actually
complete the course of training and become navigators. Even fewer are capable of
navigating a long solo trip. The apprenticeship is conducted first on land, during
lessons in which the learners must memorize large amounts of information, such
as the pattern of rising and setting stars for countless routes. Not only is star
information taught, but dozens of other topics as well, such as currents, condi
tions, waves, positions, reefs, weather, and sealife. There is a special hut for these
lessons, and mats and stones are used flexibly to represent different relevant envir
onmental elements. Lessons on land are followed by years of practice at sea, in a
graduated program of guided practice. The program of apprenticeship for the
Puluwat navigators might be seen as most similar to the modern, Western system
of medical education.
Although a variety of cultures use intentional instruction as the method of
education for the acquisition of valued economic skills, the use of intentional in
struction is even more clearly evident in the education of manners, religion, and
other socially designed practices. As Fortes (1970) observed, when children learn
practical skills, they have their own objective achievement as an evaluation of
their progress. However, when the child is learning prayers or humility or magic,
the only test for educational progress is the reaction of other people. Other people
possess all the information about taboos, charms, terms of address, and all the
many and complex aspects that make up the social rules and identity of a people.
Among the Tikopia of Polynesia, parents are considered responsible for the in
struction of children in manners, customs, and polite speech (Firth, 1970). In
North America Hopi parents strive to create "good hearts" in their children, the
feelings that motivate appropriate behavior (Eggan, 1970). In Wogeo, New Guinea,
parents believe in singara, "steering" their children's moral development (Hogbin,
1970). Parents of the Chaga tribe in Tanzania begin drilling their three-year-olds
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in the three classes of names that all family members have. By six years of age the
children have been taught terms of address and new and elaborate manners (Raum,
1970). In Uganda etiquette is also drummed into the children of the Ganda people.
They must master phrases of greeting and farewell, polite gestures, and the rules
of gift giving; errors are severely punished (Mair, 1934). The Tallensi people place
a high value on their ancestor cult and acknowledge the positive obligation they
have in transmitting it to the next generation. One chief informed Fortes, "This is
my child, and I am teaching him uprightness. If he is about to do anything that
is not seemly I tell him. so that when he grows up he will know upright ways"
(Fortes, 1970. p. 23).
Initiation rites are clearly an example of the intentional teaching of adolescents.
During adolescent initiation. Chaga boys must endure the adults' relentless repeti
tion of ethical teaching (Raum. 1970). Special isolation, taboos, and vocabulary
instruction are required of the apprentice shamans among Eskimo boys (Bernhard,
1988). For the vision quest of the North American Sioux, adults require that boys
experience four days of fasting while alone and naked in a small, deep pit. Once a
boy has survived the initiation, an elderly teacher informs him that he is now a
man and may take a new name (Lame Deer and Erdoes, 1972). The boys of the
Sambia people in the New Guinea Highlands are required to undergo a strict ini
tiation that lasts from 7 to 17 years of age. During these years initiates are totally
isolated from uninitiated males and from all of the females oi the community.
Adult males teach the initiates by telling them ritualized stories concerning mas
culine values and taboos. They also stage horrible events to deliberately frighten
the boys so that they will listen even more carefully. Furthermore, the men de
mand that the boys participate in nightly ritualized homosexual activities through
out this multiyear period in order to develop masculinity (Herdt, 1981). In these
and other initiation rites it is clear that adults are intentionally orchestrating ex
periences to create a deep impression on the children, one that will last a i etime.
Mead (1930) reports that although Manus parents expect the natural develop
ment of physical grace, they intentionally teach two important cultural values:
property rights and modesty. For example, since the rules of possession are ex
tremely important to adults, they directly and repeatedly instruct children in them.
Children are explicitly taught not to touch articles they do not own. Just one ac
of damage to another's property results in a major public scene. It e8in^ W1
drumming to the entire community, alerting everyone that a meeting wi soon
take place. At that time the crimes of the errant child are announced, an
young offender is denounced and shamed, humiliated before t e en^ire ®
community. This is not learning about cultural values by in erence.
is is
ing by direct, intentional instruction about the rules ol society.
Similarly. Lutz (1983) reports that the Ifaluk of Micronesia have a cu
of cooperation and nonaggression. Parents see themselves as resp°n.
d
suring that their children are worthy members of society. They
1
long discussions on Ifaluk customs and correct behavior as one o'
gn_
Another tool is the elicitation of the emotion they ca tru- agu.
feei
couraged to feel metagu in the presence of strangers, or w enever
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shame. If a child does not demonstrate the appropriate metagu reaction to a situ
ation. her parents issue a call to a ghostly figure (tarita), beseeching her to come
forward from her inland hiding place. The child knows that this phantom kidnaps
and eats little children, and the child understands that her parents have called the
ghost because of her misbehavior. The dreaded ghost (a female household member
in horrific disguise) appears outside the house, on cue, and the terrified child clings
for parental protection. This emotional state in the child is considered to be a very
good moment for instruction in the experience of metagu.
The examples cited above show adults engaging in formal, intentional instruc
tion of children. These are verbal encounters, separate from the daily flow of
activity and repeated as necessary until the children's behavior reaches some
preestablished criterion. The adults have requirements, and they enforce them.
This behavior by adults reflects a belief that children, for some activities and stand
ards, must be trained in the ways of the culture. Obviously, not all ways require
teaching, but when the cultural practice is highly valued, complex, or abstract,
adults use intentional instruction to ensure that their children will not embarrass
them. They want their children to be appropriate, respectable members of society,
and so they stay with the children, teaching them the upright ways. In the
ethnographies reviewed, covering numerous and far-flung societies, every society
used intentional teaching, at least for some very important aspects of cultural life.

The Effect of Intentional Instruction on Cognitive Development
We have argued and presented evidence that adults in all cultures have beliefs
about what children know and how they learn. Adults are motivated to act on
those beliefs, whether out of the tender desire for their offspring to be well ad
justed, or out of the practical need for their children's help with the economic
burdens of life. For love or money, the motivation to affect children's development
results in adult involvement in the learning process. Thus the human child, and
only the human child, is born into a developmental niche populated by educators.
Intentional instruction is a key ingredient in the recipe that creates a normally
developing human being.
We see intentional instruction as making its contribution to human develop
ment in two main ways. One effect of instruction is to enhance or even enable the
child s acquisition of many culturally relevant skills. As we have seen, scaffolding
and teaching lead to more effective learning in many domains and with many
tasks. To acquire a new skill, children often rely on adults to direct their attention
to the right things and to give them feedback about how they are doing. Adults
provide the boost children need to learn important cultural tasks efficiently and
appropriately.
However, there is a second and more profound effect of intentional instruction.
In certain instructional situations, the adult intends for the child to learn in a
special way, to adopt a new, more adult-like perspective. Children comprehend the
intention of the adult with respect to their own intentions and appropriate the
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adult's understanding. Thus, children experience instructed learning; they have a
new understanding that retains the intersubjectivity of the learning situation. As
we argued in Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993), when a child internalizes an
adult's intentions, there are dramatic effects on cognitive development.
The origins of this effect on cognitive development can be seen in the earliest
days of infancy, when adults treat children as if they have intentions toward other
people. Western mothers and their babies engage in a reciprocal smiling and vo
calizing game that resembles the turn taking of conversation (Trevarthen, 1979);
this rhythmical interaction is richly supported by the mother's structuring, and
the baby's behavior is lavishly interpreted by the mother as intentional (Kaye,
1982). Mothers on the Marquesas Islands, by contrast, hold their infants facing
out to others in the household, intending the babies to be interactive partners with
older children (Martin and Kilpatrick, 1981). Kaluli mothers in Papua New Guinea
will occasionally "speak" for their infants in high-pitched voices to entice teen
agers to chat with them (Schieffelin, 1990). Around the world the intentional
treatment of young children also includes adults' references to entities in the
environment. Adults demonstrate the uses of materials, point out features of the
environment, and highlight cause-effect relations by gesturing, vocalizing, pre
senting, and emoting. The adult intends for the child to attend to the object of
interest. In these situations adults are behaving as if their babies were mature
interactive partners with the intention of conversing. Eventually, as a result of
living in this world of intentions and expectations, and being treated accordingly,
the child comes to understand the adult, and the self, as intentional: hence, the socalled nine-month-miracle, when for the first time human infants look where adults
are looking (joint attention), feel what adults are feeling (social referencing), and
do what adults are doing (imitation). By figuring out the intentions of the other
people in their world, and by adopting these intentions as their own, children are
cognitively changed. The new understanding of persons as intentional agents
enables older infants to acquire more complex abilities, such as the use o sym o s
(Tomasello, in press), and perhaps to form a self concept (Tomase o,
.
The effect of intentional instruction does not stop at the end of infancy. Aroun
the age of four years, the child understands that other people have unique, su
jective perspectives, ones that often differ from her own. This development in e
child's social cognition supports even more elaborate cultura earning, o en l
the context of one of the forms of intentional instruction, or examp e.
may understand that she and her mother have different minds and differedpe
spectives on a task, and they converse about the task in a^diamgue exp o
differences. The two work together, in a manner controlle y e a u' '
a meeting of the minds. The adult intends to affect the child s
child is aware of this intention, and the child works to create a^wunderstandng
of the task, one based on the adult's intentions. In true
the
child leaves the interaction with an internalized dialogue a
nal
ordination of the participants' mental representations during
AsanaskkTwe should also mention that intentional instruction of the type we
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have been describing can also have profound effects on the cognitive development
of other animal species. For example, when apes receive intentional instruction
from humans-of a type they do not experience in their natural habitats—some
significant changes take place in the nature of their cognitive and social cognitive
skills (Tomasello. Savage-Rumbaugh, and Kruger, 1993; see Call and Tomasello,
in press, for a review).

Implications for Education
We have focused here on the beliefs and practices of educators. However, it is
important to recognize that in any instructional encounter there are at least two
different individuals present—teacher and learner—with different comprehensions
of the task, different plans about how to proceed, different understandings of the
other person and of what that person understands. In past educational practice,
only one of these differences between teacher and learner was emphasized: their
mismatched comprehension of the task. For generations it was held that the teacher
understands, the learner is ignorant, and the goal of education is to pass under
standing from the teacher to the learner. This view of the empty-headed pupil has
been abandoned by many lately in favor of a more generous alternative. Gardner
(1991), for example, argues that children construct naive theories of how the
world works. Their so-called unschooled minds are not empty, just less developed
than those of more educated people. This variation on the Piagetian view of the
child's mind must now be expanded to include children's naive theories ol other
persons as an important part of the process, as we emphasized in our original
formulation of the theory of cultural learning. What we have attempted to empha
size here is that to understand and enhance educational practice, this fuller model
of the child's mind must be considered in tandem with a model of the instructor s
theory of children, and their minds and learning skills, and how this affects their
choice of pedagogical method.
In Olson and Astington's (1993) view, instruction involves complex social
cognitive processes. For teachers to be effective, their thinking must integrate a
representation of the goal of the task with a representation of the learner s under
standing, and they must continuously monitor the effect of feedback and prompts
on the learner's progress. This instructional process also may be different for dif
ferent kinds of tasks. If the point is to teach the learner how to do something, such
as prepare tortillas, then teachers must craft their physical demonstrations, moni
toring, and feedback accordingly. If the point is to teach the learner how to think
about something, such as how to judge whether the current and wind speed favor
a long sailing journey, then teachers must craft interpersonal interactions such as
discussions with the learner which will prompt the learner to consider and criti
cize alternatives. A further distinction may be made between teaching students to
think about facts and teaching them to think about perspectives. Phelps and Damon
(1989) argue that when faced with the challenge of learning facts, such as the
multiplication tables, no shift in a learner's perspective is really needed. The facts
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of multiplication are "out there" in the culture; the learner just needs to get them.
This information can thus be learned more or less individually, assuming the culture
makes it available. However, when the task requires shifts in perspective-taking,
such as understanding the concept of proportion (this is relative to that), children
learn the concept much more efficiently and deeply through an intersubjective
interaction with another person. Learning concepts that rely on perspective is
facilitated by the comparison and negotiation of different points of view in social
interaction. Thus the more important it is for the child to adopt a second perspec
tive. to see things in a new way—the cultural way—the more likely it is that the
adult will intentionally instruct. Instructors' theories of domains of learning, and
how these interact with children's learning skills, are therefore an important part
of the picture as well.
In our theory of cultural learning (see Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner, 1993)
we emphasized the aspect of the process that we felt cultural psychology had
neglected: the child's cognition, especially social cognition. This led us to underemphasize the structuring role of culture and the important part played by inten
tional instruction. We have attempted to redress the balance here by explicitly
describing some of the ways that cultures shape the development of human
children, especially through the intentional instruction of others. As a speciesuniversal and species-specific developmental niche, culture is an integral part of
the process whereby human children become human adults.
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